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[1993] 3 C.M.L.R. 597; (H.L.) (Lords Slynn, Nicholls, Hoffmann, Hope and Clyde) 
INTRODUCTION 
The judgment of the House of Lords in R. v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte 
Factortame (Factortame III) has been greeted primarily with surprise that there could 
be anything left on which to give judgment in that long-running piece of litigation. In 
fact a final judgment in Factortame's action against the British Government, in respect 
of the latter's ill-fated attempt to restrict "quota-hopping" in British waters, remains 
elusive since issues of causation and quantum have still to be decided. The initial claim, 
R. v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame1 which subsequently became 
known as Factortame II, was the application for judicial review of the validity of the 
Merchant Shipping Act 1988. This gave rise to an interim Application for that Act to 
be suspended, R. v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame2 (known as 
Factortame I since it was the first issue to be decided). Finally, in Joined Cases 
Brasserie du Pecheur v. Germany and R. v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte 
Factortame3 (Factortame III) the applicants claimed damages for losses sustained while 
the invalid Act had been in force. The ruling of the Court of Justice in Factortame III 
(on the legal principles governing such damages claims) was applied by the Divisional 
Court in the United Kingdom, which had referred the issue.4 The judgment of the 
Divisional Court was subject to appeal in the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords, 
and the latter's decision has now been given. 
T H E FACTS A N D T H E HISTORY OF T H E LITIGATION 
Briefly, in the 1980s the United Kingdom Government formed the view that Spanish 
fishing vessels with no genuine connection to the United Kingdom had registered in 
Britain in order to obtain access to British fishing waters. The Government therefore 
introduced new licensing conditions pursuant to the Sea Fish (Conservation) Act, 1967 
restricting registration by reference to nationality, residence and social security 
contributions. The majority of these conditions were found by the Court of Justice to 
be unlawful in R. v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Agegate Ltd.5 
and R v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Jaderow Ltd.6 
Considering that the situation was worsening, the Government subsequently enacted 
the Merchant Shipping Act, 1988. This provided that a vessel could only be registered 
as British if all the legal owners and at least 75 per cent of the beneficial owners were 
"qualified persons or companies"7 and its charterer, manager or operator was a 
qualified person. The vessel must also be managed and its operation directed and 
controlled from within the United Kingdom. 
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On 19 June 1990, in Factortame I, the Court of Justice ruled that the English rule 
of law preventing suspension of the Act pending determination of its validity must be 
disapplied and, on 25 July 1991, in Factortame II it held that the requirements of the 
Merchant Shipping Act as to nationality, residence and domicile for legal and beneficial 
owners, charterers and managers and operators of fishing vessels were contrary to 
Community law and in particular to article 43 (ex 52) of the EC Treaty on the freedom 
of establishment. However the requirement that the vessel be managed and its 
operations directed and controlled from within a Member State was not contrary to 
Community law. 
Meanwhile, the Commission had also brought proceedings against the United 
Kingdom under article 226 (ex 169) EC. On 10 October 1989 the President of the 
Court of Justice made an order for interim suspension of the Act pending a final ruling 
and, on 4 October 1991, the Court of Justice ruled the Act invalid in the article 226 
EC proceedings. Under article 228 (ex 171) EC the United Kingdom was obliged to 
take measures to comply with this judgment. 
In Factortame HI the Court of Justice repeated its reasoning in Francovich v. Italy8 
that although the Treaty did not expressly provide for Member State liability in 
damages for breach of Community law, such liability was vital to ensure the full 
effectiveness of Community law. The obligation to remedy breaches of Community law 
was also part of the duty of Member States under article 10 (ex 5) EC to fulfill their 
Treaty obligations. However, where a Member State had a wide discretion over its 
actions, it could only be liable for a breach of Community law where that breach was 
sufficiently serious, the rule of law infringed was intended to confer rights on 
individuals and there was a direct causal link between the breach and the damage 
sustained by the applicant.9 
The Court of Justice ruled that the British Government had a wide discretion over 
the registration of vessels, which was a matter of national competence, and over 
regulation of fishing, where the common fisheries policy left a margin of discretion to 
Member States. It confirmed that the first condition was satisfied in Factortame III 
since article 43 (ex 52) EC was intended to confer rights on individuals. As to the 
second condition, the Court of Justice ruled that in assessing whether the breach of 
Community law committed by the Member State was sufficiently serious, national 
courts could take into account a number of factors. These factors included the clarity 
and precision of the rule breached, the measure of discretion left to the national 
authorities by the rule, whether the infringement and damage were intentional or 
involuntary, any contribution to the State's act or omission made by the position taken 
by a Community institution and the adoption or retention of measures or practices 
contrary to Community law.10 
When Factortame HI returned to the Divisional Court1' in the United Kingdom, that 
court ruled that, on the facts, the enactment of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1988 
constituted a sufficiently serious breach of EC law so as potentially to give rise to 
liability in damages to the applicants.12 The court noted a number of relevant factors: 
the intended effect of the domicile and residence conditions was discrimination on the 
ground of nationality; the Government was aware that the conditions would cause loss 
to the applicant; the Commission was hostile; the use of primary legislation meant that 
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under domestic law interim relief was unavailable; the superior rules of law of 
proportionality and legitimate expectation had been breached; and the Government 
had failed to comply immediately with the Order of the President of the Court of 
Justice in proceedings under article 226 (ex 169) EC that the Act should be suspended 
pending determination of its validity. 
The Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of the Divisional Court13 and the 
Government made a further appeal to the House of Lords. It argued that its breach 
was excusable, since the law was not clear until the judgment in Factortame II and 
there was substantial objective justification in the form of protection of the national 
fish quota. In addition, other Member States had adopted the same approach as the 
United Kingdom, the national courts regarded the issue as complex and the 
Government had sought and relied on independent legal advice that its action was in 
accordance with Community law. The United Kingdom was not obliged to follow the 
advice of the Commission and it had not intended to breach Community law or injure 
the respondent fishermen. Finally, even if the breach caused by the nationality 
condition was sufficiently serious, that caused by the residence condition was not. 
T H E J U D G M E N T OF T H E HOUSE OF LORDS I N F A C T O R T A M E III 
The House of Lords ruled that the conditions as to nationality and domicile constituted 
a sufficiently serious breach of Community law. First, the relevant rule of Community 
law was not ambiguous but was clear, and of fundamental importance. The EC Treaty 
prohibited any discrimination on the ground of nationality and this was underlined in 
the context of the common agricultural policy in article 34(3) (ex 40(3)) EC since any 
common organisation of the market set up under article 33 (ex 39) EC must exclude 
any discrimination between producers and consumers. 
Second, the United Kingdom Government had not acted inadvertently but after 
consideration, and the inevitable consequence of that action was to prejudice the rights 
of Spanish fishermen and non-British citizens with financial stakes in British registered 
fishing vessels. 
Third, the nationality condition was obviously discriminatory and contrary to article 
43 (ex 52 EC). Here, the House of Lords permitted itself to comment obliquely on the 
fact that the Court of Justice had exceeded its jurisdiction under article 234 (ex 177) 
EC by straying from the interpretation of Community law into its application on the 
facts. The House of Lords noted that, although the question of whether this was a 
sufficiently serious breach was a matter for the national courts, the Court of Justice had 
"stated bluntly that the nationality condition constituted direct discrimination which 
was manifestly contrary to Community law". 
Fourth, the adoption of the nationality condition in the Act was not an uninten-
tional or excusable breach. It was true that legal advice had suggested that a nationality 
test would be compatible with Community law and that Advocate General Mischo had 
argued in Jaderow14 that Community law did not restrict the registration of vessels and, 
in Agegate,15 that certain residence conditions were compatible with Community law. 
However, that legal advice was qualified and Member State discretion in this area was 
subject to Community control under the Common Fisheries Policy. The Commission 
had told the United Kingdom Government that the proposed conditions were 
13
 [1998] 3 C . M . L . R . 192. 
14
 See n. 6, supra. 
15
 See n. 5, supra. 
104 Nottingham Law Journal 
prima facie contrary to the right of establishment under article 43 (ex 52) EC. It had 
continued to state its opposition and eventually took article 226 (ex 169) EC 
proceedings. Although this advice was not conclusive as to whether there had been a 
breach of Community law, it was suggestive. In addition, the Divisional Court (and 
later the House of Lords) suspended all three conditions, and the decisions of the Court 
of Justice in Jaderow and Agegate gave the government no encouragement. It was also 
obvious that the damage suffered by the respondents would be serious and immediate. 
In summary, the deliberate adoption of legislation which was clearly discriminatory 
on the ground of nationality, and which inevitably violated article 43 (ex 52) EC, was 
a manifest breach of the EC Treaty. It was a grave breach, both intrinsically and as 
regards the consequences it was likely to have on the respondents. The Commission 
opposed it and, despite the view of Advocate General Mischo, there was no decision 
of the Court of Justice to support it. The nationality condition therefore constituted a 
sufficiently serious breach. The retention of this condition after the decisions in the 
Agegate and Jaderow and the short transitional period before the coming into force of 
the 1988 Act constituted a sufficiently serious breach. The domicile condition should be 
treated in the same way as nationality, and it was therefore also a sufficiently serious 
breach. 
As to the residence condition, a condition applicable to fishermen could be justifiable 
on the ground of protecting British fishing communities if limited to residence in those 
communities. However, a condition which covered shareholders and directors of 
companies owning fishing vessels but allowed fishermen to live anywhere could not be 
justified. Discrimination on grounds of residence could constitute indirect discrimi-
nation on grounds of nationality16 and in any event it was artificial to separate the 
conditions. Rather, they should be treated as cumulative. The residence condition 
therefore constituted a sufficiently serious breach. 
C O M M E N T 
There is little of surprise in this judgment in the light of the clear steer given by the 
Court of Justice in Factortame III towards a finding of a sufficiently serious breach, 
and the judgments of the Divisional Court and the Court of Appeal to that effect. The 
importance of the judgment really lies in the fact that the highest court in the land has 
now stated, unequivocally, that the actions of the United Kingdom in respect of 
quota-hopping constituted a sufficiently serious breach of Community law potentially 
giving rise to damages. The judgment also gives guidance for future applicants and the 
government. First, the fact that favourable legal advice is received will not, of itself, 
render a breach of Community law excusable. Second, any delay in giving effect to a 
ruling of the Court of Justice is likely to be considered to be a sufficiently serious 
breach of Community law in itself. Third, where a serious injury to the potential 
applicant is a foreseeable result of the government's action, this will also give weight 
to the argument that there has been a sufficiently serious breach. 
CONCLUSION 
This judgment dealt solely with the issue of whether the breach of Community law 
committed by the United Kingdom constituted a sufficiently serious breach. The Court 
16
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of Justice had already ruled that the rule of law breached was for the protection of 
individuals and the third condition for State liability in damages, the existence of a 
causal link, was not considered. A further judgment will therefore be required in 
respect of each applicant in order to determine whether the enactment and retention of 
the Merchant Shipping Act caused loss to them. Indeed it has been reported that 
lawyers for many potential applicants among the Spanish fishing community are 
already working on their compensation claims.17 
The establishment of a causal link will not necessarily be easy. For example, in 
Brasserie du Pecheur v. Germany1* the Bundesgerichtshof (the German Federal High 
Court) ruled that the German Government's prohibition on the import of beer 
containing additives, although a sufficiently serious breach, had not caused loss to the 
applicant because no proceedings had been taken against it pursuant to that 
prohibition.19 
Similarly, in R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte John 
Gallagher20 the Court of Appeal ruled that there was no causal link between the United 
Kingdom's breach of Community law and the loss suffered by the applicant, Gallagher. 
The latter had been excluded from the United Kingdom pursuant to procedures laid 
down by the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 which the 
Court of Justice subsequently found to be contrary to Directive 64/221 on derogations 
from the free movement of persons. However, the Court of Appeal held that he could 
lawfully have been excluded had the procedure laid down in the Directive been 
properly followed, and indeed would have been so excluded. 
Indeed, a failure to prove causation was also fatal ultimately to the claim in 
Francovich v. Italy (Francovich H).2i Although that case itself involved the non-
transposition of a Directive, and therefore the conditions for State liability were slightly 
different,22 the applicant failed to prove the causal link between the State's breach and 
the loss he had suffered. On the facts, the Directive which Italy had failed to transpose 
into national law would not have given rights to Francovich. 
The final hurdle which the Factortame applicants face is the award of damages. In 
the absence of Community legislation governing the award of remedies, national law 
applies subject to the requirement that reparation must not be impossible or excessively 
difficult to obtain,23 and therefore issues such as the mitigation of loss must be 
addressed. In the interests of justice it is to be hoped that these outstanding issues are 
resolved more expeditiously than those so far addressed. 
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